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PANTHEISM AND PERSONAL IMMORTALITY1 
T HE inquiring mind, in science and in philosophy, is actuated by different motives. Prudence impels it to 
undertake those investigations which promise definite res~~lts. 
But wisdom compels it to grapple also with some problems 
of vital importance despite their baffling character. The 
problem of human destiny is one of the latter sort. If we are 
to deal intelligently with it, we should understand what kind 
of answer we are warranted in expecting. The various sci- 
ences abound in topics that admit of a factual statement 
which can be learned from those who have ascertained the 
facts. The question of personal immortality requires a differ- 
ent treatment, and we should be starting wrong if we set out 
to get scientific knowledge of life after death. 
This is an important point, and we should understand it 
clearly to avoid misapprehension. Ask Job's question: "If a 
man die, shall he live again?" A simple answer, yes or no, 
would scarcely enlighten us, unless we consider first the 
meaning of the question-what the answer to it would signify. 
Yes, we may be told, a man shall live and does live after his 
death, in the memory of his survivors and in his influence on 
them; or, yes, his soul or spiritual essence survives the dissolu- 
tion of his body. But no, it may be argued, there can be no 
survival of soul or mind after the body with its organs of 
consciousness has perished; and as to social survival in 
memory or influence, it is alI vely unstable and temporary, 
and in any case i t  does not concern the destiny of the man 
himself. Clearly we are not here answering Job's question but 
Foerster Lecture on the Immortality of the Soul, delivered at the 
University of California, Berkeley, November 9, 1951. 
1 
The  Rice Institute Pamphlet 
only making a little progress in understanding it and its diffi- 
culties. 
I t  is a commonplace of philosophy that some of the deepest 
problems are basically problems of interpretation. We cannot 
settle them and dispose of them, but we can try to clarify 
them, to see what insight into reality they help us to attain. 
The problem of immortality is a problem in the interpreta- 
tion of personality. By reflecting on the destiny of man we 
may hope to probe deeper into the nature of man and into 
the nature of reality that includes men and personal careers. 
This sort of inquiry is appropriate to our theme, and we 
should pursue it as far as we are able. 
We shall mention several aspects of our vast problem and 
then select one of them for more careful examination. So we 
may ask: How could a man's soul exist and be active after the 
death of his body? Early in primitive societies men had a 
consciousness of a certain weird duality in their being. They 
knew, of course, their obvious material body; but on the 
other hand, there was their soul or spirit, the elusive core or 
essence of their existence, subtle and mysterious. Even dur- 
ing its present life the soul leaves the body and has strange 
adventures of its own in dreams and visions. Left helpless 
in prolonged unconsciousness, the body without its soul dies 
and decays. What then becomes of the soul that has lost its 
body? Primitive reflection had a choice of two answers which 
were developed into capital doctrines of the main religions. 
One of these answers to the riddle of man's destiny is the 
doctrine of the transmigration of souls. The soul and the 
body normally live together and need each other. Though 
the soul leaves the body in dreams, it returns to it on awaken- 
ing. The unduly lengthened absence of the soul proves dis- 
astrous to the body. But how does the death and disintegra- 
tion of the body affect the future career of the soul? Surely it 
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must find and inhabit another body. This doctrine of transmi- 
gration or metempsychosis was widespread in primitive 
speculation. I t  was later advocated by the Pythagoreans and 
by Plato. Its most extensive development, however, was in 
Brahmanic India. 
An alternative answer to the question about the soul's 
destiny proceeded from the reflection that the soul does 
separate from the body, in sleep, in states of unconsciousness. 
The soul, then, can exist and act by itself. The primitive mind 
reasoned: when the body dies and decays, the soul con- 
tinues somehow in a disembodied state. This is the so-called 
ghost theoiy, which in its more developed forms has been 
distinguished as the specific belief in the soul's immortality. 
These two doctrines of human destiny have been explored 
in their historical ramifications, and critical students have 
sought to sustain or to unsettle each of them by searching 
examination. Even now we can hardly turn aside from them 
without mentioning one line of analysis that has proved very 
fruitful. In  both of these doctrines we may note the progres- 
sive ascendency of moral evaluations. The soul's transmigra- 
tion or its disembodied existence after the death of the body 
have both been regarded as subject to the principle of retri- 
bution. The soul is reborn into the sort of body to which 
God's justice assigns it, high or low, noble or debased, as it 
may deserve. So likewise the belief in a disembodied state 
develops into elaborate doctrines of ultimate rewards and 
punishments for saints and sinners, in heaven and hell, as 
we find them in Zoroastrian, Christian, and Mohammedan 
theologies. This is essentially a moral approach to the prob- 
lem of immortality. It has led to more searching studies of 
the career and finality of persons, in which the recognition of 
the eternal conservation of spiritual values has been a domi- 
nant principle and has proved very enlightening. 
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As men's thought on their destiny centers upon the prin- 
ciple of retribution under God's just providence and the 
abiding reality of personal values, we may note a very sig- 
nscant  relation between the idea of immortality and the 
conception of God. The study of this reIation of ideas is of 
philosophical as well as religious interest. The roots of our 
idea of human destiny intertwine with the roots of our idea 
of God. This correlation will be the subject of our approach 
to the problem of personal immortality. We shall consider 
how men's beliefs about their destiny have reflected and also 
innuenced their ideas of God and of the ultimate nature of 
things. Our special inquiry has been indicated in our title: 
"Pantheism and Personal Immortality." Pantheism is not only 
a fundamental alternative conception of God but also a 
tendency or a direction of emphasis which, in greater or 
lesser degree, characterizes many theologies and philosophies 
of religion. One of the surest ways of recognizing and ap- 
praising this pantheistic slant of thought is by considering 
its approach to the problem of personal immortality. 
The term 'pantheism" comes from two Greek words mean- 
ing "all-God." I t  designates the doctrine that God is the basic 
unity and essence of all beings. God and the world, ultimate 
reality, are one. Sometimes this may be only a way of ex- 
plaining God's nature by explaining it away. "God" is then 
merely the world, the sum-total of existence. But the true 
reIigious pantheist means to express something radically 
different. He concentrates on the idea of God's infinite and 
all-permeating reality. Infinite Deity is, in the full sense, real. 
Finite beings, as finite, fall short of expressing reality ade- 
quately. They are truly real only in their relation to the 
Infinite, in their ultimate unity with God. So Emerson sang 
for us again the ancient Brahmanic chant of pantheism: 
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They reckon ill who leave me out; 
When me they fly, I am the wings; 
I am the doubter and the doubt, 
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings. 
WhiIe panfheism has tended to depreciate the reality of 
the finite, of particular things and persons, it has also recog- 
nized the ultimate reality of the least of them, when con- 
sidered in relation to God. In the least of them the whole 
universe is revealed. This is the emphasis in Tennyson3s lyric, 
familiar to everyone: 
Flower in the crannied wall, 
I pluck you out of the crannies, 
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand, 
Little flower-but if I could understand 
What you are, root and all, and all in all, 
I should know what God and man is. 
Pantheistic beliefs and tendencies have been widespread 
across the entire history of religion and philosophy. Without 
any exhaustive survey, we may note some of the main in- 
stances. The outstanding example in oriental religions is the 
mystical doctrine of the Upanishads. The ancient Vedas of 
India record an advance from the polytheistic worship of the 
countless forces or aspects of nature toward the conviction 
that all divine powers are basically one, Sky god, wind god, 
fire god-all these are phases of each other. To deeper insight 
they are revealed as different forms of the one primal and 
final reality. "That One," all-creative and all-dominant, (Vis- 
vakarman and Prajapati), is Brahman. So begins a mystical 
chant in the Maitri Upanishad: 
Thou art Brahma, and verily thou art Vishnu. 
Thou art Rudra. Thou art Prajapati. 
Thou art Agni, Varuna, and Vayu. 
Thou art Indra. Thou art the Moon. 
Thou art food. Thou art Yama. Thou art the Earth. 
Thou art All. Yea, thou art the unshaken one! 
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Brahman, the infinite reality, is all -pervading. The world 
of particular things may seem manifold and unstable, but 
it is one and eternally real in its infinite essence. That is 
Atman, the soul or inner principle of every single thing, one 
with the all-permeating Brahman. The pantheistic medita- 
tions of the seers in the Upanishads had one supreme purpose: 
to advance from the surface view of Maya, the illusory per- 
ception of the world of countless things, to the penetrating 
insight into the unity of them all in God. 
In  classical antiquity the pantheistic strain found initial 
philosophical expression in monism, the doctrine that the 
boundless variety of things is rooted in one primal substance: 
water or air or some infinite stuff or core of all existence, This 
monism was unstable in ancient classical thought. On the 
one hand, the problem of reconciling change and permanence 
led Greek minds towards pluralism. Nature was portrayed 
as a process of ever-shifting combinations of unchanging 
particles. On the other hand, the basic distinction of matter 
and mind gave a dualistic turn to philosophical reflection, 
especially notable in Platonism. The most thoroughly pan- 
theistic view of nature in Greece and Rome was the philo- 
sophical religion of the Stoic sages. According to Cicero, 
Cleanthes the Stoic taught that the world itself is God. More 
clearly, however, the Stoics regarded God as the world-soul. 
They called all existence material, but they reinterpreted 
matter to signify the universal reality of nature in all its forms 
from the lowest to the highest. The highest permeates and 
rules the lowest. Like fire consuming and transforming all 
things, like germinating reason vitalizing all beings, God 
is manifest in all things, directs and permeates them all. 
Modern forms of pantheistic speculation have followed 
mainly two patterns: the monism of Spinoza and idealistic 
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pantheism. Spinoza reinterpreted the problem of the relation 
of mind and matter. In his metaphysics body and mind are 
regarded, not as two different substances, but as two attri- 
butes of the One Infinite Substance, which he called "God or 
Nature." There is a bodily phase and there is a mental phase 
of existence, and these correspond to each other. Our prog- 
ress in understanding must proceed from the random percep- 
tion of various things, bodily or mental states, to the true 
rational knowledge of things and ideas in their order 
and relation to each other, Thus we can see each thing as a 
mode or phase of the one infinite God or Nature, see all things 
in their universal context, in their cosmic setting, "under the 
pattern of eternity." This was Spinoza's philosophical relig- 
ion, finding its summit in his amor intellectualis Dei, the 
intellectual or the understanding love of God. 
For many of Spinoza's contemporaries, his pantheism of 
the One Infinite Substance was only an ambiguous form of 
atheism. The doctrine of God or Nature was in its effect, as 
they read it, a godless doctrine. It reduced God to nature 
and found no ultimate provision for the moral-spiritual val- 
ues of personality, without which the terms God or divine 
had no real meaning which religion could recognize. After 
being scorned for more than a century as a system of impiety, 
Spinoza's philosophy was revived and revised in a more 
spiritual version during the period of modern idealism. A 
whole generation of productive thinkers in philosophy and 
literature, reacting more immediately to the dominant in- 
fluence of Kant, turned also to Spinoza and reinterpreted 
significantIy his pantheistic doctrine. Spinoza's "God or Na- 
ture" came to signify to them 'Nature or God." Schelling de- 
scribed nature as dormant or latent Spirit. Goethe viewed 
nature as the divine drama, instinct with all the potencies of 
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spirit which it manifests in the creative achievements of 
our minds. The romanticists extolled Spinoza as the God- 
intoxicated man. 
In his concentration on the One Infinite Substance, God 
or Nature, Spinoza had not given due consideration to the 
distinctive reality and activity of finite individuals. For him 
the true reality of particular beings could be seen only in 
their relation to the Infinite, This aspect of Spinoza's philoso- 
phy was not convincing to those idealists who had leained 
from Kant to respect the unique and inviolable moral dignity 
and worth of each person. Some of them regarded the par- 
ticular determinations of the divine reality as having their 
own distinctive r6les. In  individual experience and in the 
system of social-institutional life, these idealists developed 
the guiding principle of moral philosophy: "Be a person, 
and respect others as persons." But other idealists had pan- 
theistic leanings. 
Our brief survey of the historical development of pantl~eisn~ 
has brought us repeatedly to its basic problem, namely, its 
interpretation of the unique status and destiny of persons. 
This problem should be examined more directly, by a con- 
sideration of what may be called the pantheistic substitutes 
for personal immortality. 
We remarked that Brahmanic India developed most ex- 
tensively the belief in the transmigration of souls. According 
to the Brahmanic doctrine of retribution, when a man dies, 
the law of karma causes his soul to be reborn into another 
body, high or low, depending on his deserts. All ranks and 
castes and all conditions of men and animals could be ex- 
plained in this way. The soul that has lived a beastly life will 
eventually be reborn in a beast. So we are told: "Those who 
are of stinking conduct here-the prospect is, indeed, that 
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they will enter a stinking womb, either the womb of a dog, 
or the womb of a swine, or the womb of an outcast." Al- 
though ale reborn soul has no memory of former lives, its 
present state is that which it has merited by its conduct in 
some past life. Yet here was the important point: each deed 
and each life were bound to have their retribution in some 
future existence, but not necessarily in the next following re- 
birth. A saint might have to go through hundreds of vile 
rebirths to expiate his iniquities in former unremembered 
lives, while a scoundrel might be born next as a holy Brahmin 
in requital for some immemorial righteousness. 
Thus bound to the wheel of rebirth and not knowing what 
to expect next, where were men to find a ground for hope 
and moral resolution? Transmigration has been called "the 
great bugbear-the terrible nightmare and daymare of Indian 
philosophers and metaphysicians." The Brahmanic pantheists 
held transmigration to be a fact, but they refused to accept it 
as man's ultimate destiny, Their deepest hope was to be re- 
leased from the cycle of rebirths, and finally to be absorbed 
into the Infinite Brahman. The atheists (Nastikas) saw only 
man's bodily life, to be lived here and now, once for all. 
Gautama Buddha and his disciples preached a gospel of 
direct release by enlightenment. Denying both the belief in 
Brahman and the doctrine of a substantial soul, the Buddhists 
recognized in human life only the ever-changing composition 
of various bodily and mental states. But in this course of 
man's existence they traced the law of retribution exacting 
the necessary consequence of each action. This is the Bud- 
dhist law of karma. According to this law, a life of seEsh and 
thoughtless sensuality has its effects in further Eves of the 
same evil sort. A saintly life of true enlightenment, however, 
by overcoming passion and iniquity and by complete renun- 
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ciation of egoism in all its forms, may attain the bliss and 
the peace and the final surcease of Nirvana, the extinguish- 
ment of self. 
These two radical alternatives, Nastika atheism and Bud- 
dhism, are only mentioned here to set off more clearly the 
Brahmanic-pantheistic solution of the quandary of retributive 
transmigration. The sages of the Upanishads taught salvation 
through saintly understanding, salvation as the soul's final 
absorption in the Infinite Brahman. This is nowise personal 
immortality, a person's eternal life with God. I t  is the tran- 
scendence of personal existence, its becoming one with God, 
as a river becomes one with the sea into which it flows and 
is absorbed. In this blessed state which is the hope of the 
Brahmanic seers, all the marks of individual existence are 
transcended : 
What is soundless, touchless, formless, imperishable, 
Likewise tasteless, constant, odorless, 
Without beginning, without end, higher than the great, 
stable- 
By discerning That, one is liberated from the mouth of death. 
Despite the radical differences which separate Brahmanism 
and Buddhism, both of them ascribe evil to the life of the 
individual self and seek salvation and 'blessedness through 
transcendence of individuality. But neither of them probes 
thoroughly the important problem of the interrelation of 
personality and values. We should recognize that personality 
is the medium for the expression of all values, good as well 
as bad. The transcendence of persons cannot be regarded 
only as an emancipation from evil, for it would affect the 
reality of the whole scale of values. The extolled Brahmanic 
and Buddhist blessedness by extinction of self is a blessedness 
without anyone blessed. 
A similar strain of ambiguity may be traced in Greek 
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philosophy. Plato has been proclaimed as the high priest 
of the belief in the immortality of the soul. While Plato 
declared in his famous arguments that the career of man's 
rational soul is eternal, his philosophy conceived of reality 
as a system of universal principles. He considered particular 
things as limited by the finitude of the material world of 
sense. How, then, could we regard individual souls as eternal? 
This vagueness is even more evident in Aristotle. In his cos- 
mology of form-in-matter, the soul was regarded as the vital 
principle in a body, its essential character as a living being. 
The human soul shares some of its capacities or faculties with 
plants and with animals: its powers to vegetate and grow; 
its locomotion, sensation and desire. These aspects of our 
nature cannot be regarded as immortal. The question of man's 
immortality could only concern his distinctive power of 
reason. And on this point Aristotle was at best obscure. He 
recognized the eternal character of the principle of ration- 
ality. God is creative reason eternally thinking itself, and the 
cosmic system of form-in-matter essentially manifests itself 
in the production of rational nature. But Aristotle did not 
maintain definitely the immortality of the individual rational 
persons, of Socrates or Plato. Indeed, a passage in the 
Nicomachean Etlzics cites the wish for immortality as an 
instance of desiring impossible things. 
The pantheistic problem of human destiny may be ex- 
amined more particularly in Greek and Roman Stoicism. The 
Stoics of the earlier Athenian period taught the doctrine of 
cosmic cycles and the eternal recurrence of all things. In the 
course of eternity the world goes through every possible 
stage and form of being. When the whole round of possibili- 
ties has been exhausted, a cosmic conflagration marks the 
end of a world-age, and another aeon repeats the universal 
drama. In  this view of eternal recurrence, how was the span 
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of a man's career to be conceived? The Stoics in Athens dif- 
fered in their answers. The founder of the school, Zeno, 
seems to have advocated not so much the immortality of 
the soul as its longevity. The soul is of fine stuff and is more 
durable than the coarse body, but aU souls perish eventually. 
Only the universal World-Soul is imperishable. Zeno's suc- 
cessor, Cleanthes, believed that all men's souls survived 
through their entire world-age. But the next Stoic leader, 
Chrysippus, entertained a view of aristocratic distinction. He 
believed that only the rational souls of sages outlive the 
death of their bodies. The sensual soul perishes with its body. 
To be sure, so long as the Stoics held to the belief in world- 
cycles and eternal recurrence, they contemplated the repe- 
tition of all souls and a11 things in succeeding world-ages. 
Socrates would again walk the streets of some future Athens, 
they thought, and so would his shrewish wife, Xantippe. 
When Stoicism was introduced into Rome, its advocate, 
Panaetius, had abandoned the doctrine of world-cycles. The 
Roman Stoics viewed nature as an ongoing system of the 
various types or grades of bodies, permeated and directed by 
the divine providence of Universal Reason. In this material- 
istic pantheism, eveiy being was determined by the eternal 
laws appropriate to its nature. Regarding human destiny, the 
Roman Stoics seem to have proceeded from vague or un- 
steady advocacy of personal immortality, toward indigerence 
to it, and then to final and explicit rejection of it. These varie- 
ties' or stages of reflection may be noted successively in 
Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. 
Cicero combined Stoic beliefs with his Platonism. He noted 
the disagreements of Stoics about the destiny of the soul. Is 
the belief in immortality an inference from our doctrine of 
the soul's nature and its material composition, or does it 
follow from our ideas of men's deserts and God's justice? 
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Cicero was not sure, but he did not renounce his faith in 
divine providence and final rational direction of human 
destinies. In  his perplexity he said that he would rather go 
astray with Plato than be right in agreeing with those who 
reject immortality. Seneca wrote letters of consolation to 
friends in their bereavement, and he could give some elo- 
quent expressions of the immortal hope; but his words 
lacked the tone of firm and reasoned conviction. "Perhaps," 
he wrote to his friend Lucilius, "if only the tale told by wise 
men is true, and there is a bourne to welcome us, then he 
whom we think we have lost has only been sent on ahead." 
But he also spoke of death as the final cessation and nullity 
of us all. 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius proceeded to serene nega- 
tion of the belief in immortality. Epictetus had moral as well 
as metaphysical grounds for his indifference to the traditional 
belief, God alone is eternal. Eveiy particular being is in its 
nature a finite and impermanent composition of various ma- 
terials. "God gives the signal for retreat; he opens the door 
and says to you: Go. Go whither? . . . To the elements: what 
there was in you of fire, goes to fire; of earth, to earth; of air 
(spirit), to air; of water, to water." Every soul in common 
with everything else in nature has its appointed place and 
time; it comes like the hour, and like the hour it must pass. 
This is the necessary rational order of things, and to complain 
of it as unjust is petulant and unseenlly before God. To make 
appeal to rewarding and punishing justice in the hereafter 
is to misunderstand the true nature of virtue and vice. Virtue 
is its own reward, here and now; and vice is its own punish- 
ment and ruin. To seek a future recompense for a virtuous 
life is to follow reason and God not righteously but for hire. 
The tribulations of the good life as well as its joys have their 
worth in themselves, and we have no just grounds for further 
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claims or complaints. Marcus Aurelius concluded on a note 
of resigned serenity: "Depart then with good grace; for he 
who dismisses thee is gracious." 
The materialistic description of the system of nature and 
even of God always allowed for the Platonic protest that the 
rational mindis not material and is not subject to the dissolu- 
tion of bodies. Spinoza's philosophy was distinguished by 
its rejection both of materialism and of cosmological dualism. 
By regarding mind and body as essential attributes of nature, 
Spinoza's pantheism brought out the basic relation of the 
finite and the infinite in his treatment of the problem of 
personal immortality. 
Spinoza agreed with the Stoics in rejecting any claim to 
immortal blessedness as a reward for virtue. "Blessedness is 
not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself." The life of 
rational insight is its own warrant and justifies itself by its 
inherent excellence. I t  is worthy to be chosen in preference 
to the life of ignorance and passion, irrespective of the dura- 
tion of human existence. 
Spinoza, however, was aware of a problem which the 
Stoics had not recognized sufficiently: the problem of the 
nature and cosmic r61e of man's contemplative reason which 
can emancipate itself from servitude to the passions, can 
perceive and pursue and achieve truth, can experience the 
intellectual or understanding love of God. In the concluding 
fifth part of his Ethics, Spinoza wrote of the mind's ability 
to advance beyond the usual processes of rational inquiry to 
what he called scientia intuitiua, intuitive knowledge, by 
which we grasp eternal truths directly. We are reminded of 
Kepler's conviction that at  the climax of his scientific con- 
templation he was thinking God's thoughts after him. Doesn't 
the mind in its highest activity rise above its ordinary rela- 
tion to the body, reach beyond the finite bounds of mortality? 
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Earlier, in his Short Treatise, Spinoza had distinguished two 
aspects or two r6Ies of the mind. On the one hand, mind is 
the idea or the mental aspect of the body, and like the body 
it is particular, finite, and mortal. On the other hand, mind 
is united with God, can neither be nor be known without 
God, and, like God, is unchangeable and eternal. This con- 
viction of Spinoza found fuller expression in his Ethics. Even 
while living our bodily life, we can know the ultimate essence 
of our body, know it as God knows it. This highest mode of 
thinking is necessarily eternal, and through it the mind con- 
ceives itself as eternal. 
At this point it is important not to confuse Spinozaas doc- 
trine with the traditional beliefs in personal immortality. The 
mind's eternity which Spinoza contemplated did not include 
any individual memories or ordinary consciousness. He re- 
LC jected the common opinion of men who confuse eternity 
with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the mem- 
ory which they believe to remain after death." In its highest 
knowledge, "intuitive science," the mind attains divine in- 
sight, but this summit of rationality does not signify eternal 
continuance of individual existence. Spinoza's eternity is 
beyond duration and time; it is timeless infinitude, like that 
of the eternal truths. Spinoza was not speaking of a person's 
immortal life and career after death, but of the mind's ca- 
pacity even now to think the trutl~s of eternity, Thus being 
even now with God, that is, contemplating the nature of 
things in tlleir eternal pattern, why should one be concerned 
about death? "A free man," he wrote, "thinks of nothing less 
than of death, and his wisdom is not a meditation upon death, 
but upon life." There was Spinoza's body smitten with con- 
sumption and day by day drawing closer to its doom, and 
there were his daily feelings, fears, and desires, all of them 
finite and transitory. But there was also his reason that knew 
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the essential nature of his bodily life and concentrated itself 
on ultimate and eternal understanding. He was that con- 
sumptive body, but he was also a mind consecrated to the 
truths of eternity, and he was convinced that "the human 
mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but 
something of it remains which is eternal." One side of him 
was individual, finite, and mortal; but on the other side he 
could get beyond finite individuality and, by grasping truth, 
share in the eternity of the Infinite, 
I t  can be seen that Spinoza's pantl~eism recognized an 
eternal character in the highest intellectual activities of 111.1- 
man life. But the question still remained: in the attainment 
of this eternal cl~aracter, is the individual wl~olly absorbed 
in the Infinite, or does some significant distinction remain 
between man and God? Spinoza denied the eternal duration 
of memory or imagination, but did he not recognize unique 
characteristics in each mind's rational contemplation or intui- 
tion, unique values of each personality, which are never 
quite effaced? By raising these questions in our minds, even 
though he does not answer them, Spinoza may lead us to the 
inodern idealistic approach. to the problem of immortality. 
The guiding principle in the idealistic reinterpretation of 
human destiny is of central importance in the philosophy of 
religion, It affects the basic conception of both God and 
man. Here Kant's far-reaching influence is twofold. I t  is in- 
effectual in sustaining the old reliance on a rewarding and 
punishing Divine Providence, but it advances to new ground 
of confidence in the conservation and enhancement of per- 
sonal values. In his ethics of pure devotion to duty, Kant 
advocated two moral arguments for immortality. The first 
is a reformulation of the old argument of rewards and punish- 
ments in the hereafter. Although morality demands the con- 
secration of the righteous will to duty, without any regard for 
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consequences, yet we are bound to recognize that in a ra- 
tional universe under God's judgment virtue must ultin~ately 
lead to happiness consuinmated beyond this life in the 
hereafter. Kant's statement of this argument is not proof 
against the objections to its earlier theological versions, and 
it is not advocated in the true spirit of his moral rigorism. 
It is Kant's second argument which marks his real advance 
of thought. Here he proceeded from an analysis of the moral 
act itself. Every moral decision reveals the will as identifying 
itself with an ideal perfect value, despite the drag of the 
desires and inclinations and despite the will's inadequate 
perforn~ance. The moral agent is committed to an ideal 
course which no finite series of actions can ever consummate. 
In the world of nature we have our finite span of time and 
mortality, but as members of the world of values our career 
is the etei-nal pursuit of perfection. 
I t  should be clear that Kant reinterpreted both the idea 
of God and the idea of personal immortality in terms of the 
principIe of perfection. He regarded the traditional theoreti- 
cal arguments for God's existence as invalid or insufficient. 
He advocated the belief in God as a postulate of morality. 
God was for him the center and the summit of the world of 
values. If we take morality seriously, then we must recognize 
that our dutiful pursuit of perfection is not the pursuit of an 
illusion but of an ideally infinite and perfect reality. Our 
moral destiny as persons is an eternal devotion to the Eternal. 
The bearing of pantheism on persona1 immortality may 
now be seen in a new light. Our inquily is concerned with the 
essential character of value and value activity, TVe could 
pursue this topic in its extensive historical developnlellt and 
consider the various applications or criticisms of Kant's doc- 
trine by modern thinkers. But perhaps we have had already 
enough historical reviews, and it would be better now to 
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distinguish clearly the main alternative ways of thought 
which a philosophy of religion should appraise in testing its 
grounds of faith regarding human destiny. 
The scientific view of nature combines experimental evi- 
dence with theoretical analysis and construction. Our ana- 
logous procedure in dealing with the reality of values should 
likewise combine the direct evidence of values in the various 
fields of our activity with the systematic appraisal of the 
principal characteristics of values and the organization of 
these characteristics in some convincing pattern. Here the 
chief problem seems to be one of the right distribution of 
emphasis. Values are known to us in our personal experience, 
unique in each individual yet generally social in their de- 
velopment. ActualIy finite as we know them in our daily 
activity, values are infinite in their ideal implications. They 
have their own meaning in the present scene, but the range 
of their perfection is boundless and eternal. 
We may test this account in our own minds and see how 
the principal values manifest these various aspects. 
IntelIectual value, truth, expresses characteristically its 
finite-infinite qualities. Our truths as we know them are 
definitely relative in their basis of validity and in their range 
of application, but every one of them points toward an 
infinite summit of Truth as its ideal and standard. Intellec- 
tual progress is the self-revision and self-reconstitution of 
our truths in accordance with this ideal. 
Aesthetic values as they are embodied in works of art 
seem, even at best, to be the recaptured memories of ideal 
visions. Was it Shelley who wrote that the most gloi-ious 
poem must be a feeble shadow of the creative experience 
which gave it birth? Lucretius bewailed the povei-ty of his 
Latin speech, that it could not convey the fullness of his 
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poetic meaning. Dante, at a crucial turn in his Divine 
Comedy, exclaimed: 
0 ye who have sound understanding, mark, 
Mark well the doctrine which is hidden here 
Under the veiling of these verses dark. 
Great music'and great poetry always mean more than they 
say. In finite vesiares of tone or speech, they seek to express 
infinite significance and beauty. 
The values of the moral and the religious life manifest the 
same duality of character. Justice is obviously social in its 
field of realization, yet it is unique and individual in each 
instance of claim and counter claim. It has very definite 
requirements in each specific case, yet is never finally 
achieved; for justice raises its aims as it attains them, and 
ever points beyond itself to a surpassing ideal. Religious ex- 
perience provides the most sublime instances of this dual in- 
tent of value activity. Religion applies the speech of the 
most intimate personal life to express our relation to God- 
to God before whose infinite and eternal reality our every 
word, finite and limited at best, unsays itself and becomes 
dumb. Yet though theology contemplates Deity as transcen- 
dent and ultimate, we worship God as our Father. These two 
sides of contending emphasis provide the perennial anti- 
phony of religious utterance, 
We observed that our main problem here seems to be one 
of the right distribution of emphasis in interpreting the na- 
ture of value, If we overemphasize either the aspect of value 
as finite, empirical, and temporal-or the aspect of value as 
infinite, transcendent, and eternal, we become embroiled in 
difficulties from which only the fair recognition of the other 
neglected aspect can deliver us. The right course would 
seem to be one of mediation and balance; but again, which 
way should we incline? 
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The pantheist overemphasizes the aspect of infinitude in 
value in having perfect reality pervade and absorb all finite 
individuals. The pantheistic tendencies of some modern 
idealists may be noted in their unsteady estimate of the 
r6le and destiny of persons. While the Kantian principle of 
the unique value and inviolable dignity of each man is re- 
affirmed as a basic moral law governing all social relations, 
the ultimate recognition of this principle in some idealistic 
philosophies of religion is very ambiguous. Man's aspiration 
toward communion and union with God is acknowledged as 
his characteristic striving for pel-fection, his finite will reach- 
ing toward infinitude. But if the Infinite is then proclaimed 
as alone tivly real and as absorbing into itself all finite 
values and persons, do we not lose an essential aspect of the 
values that we experience and know? One example of this 
pantheistic slant of reflection nlay suffice here. Schleier- 
macher's mystical conception of God led him to indecision 
regarding personal immortality. He declared: "In the midst 
of the finite, to be one with the Infinite, to be eternal every 
moment, that is the immortality of religion." This is a fine 
statement of the spiritual life, but is it an adequate answer 
to the question about human destiny? Note how a bereaved 
wife was led by the very intensity of her grief to force the 
question. Henrietta von h/liil~lenfels pondered over the death 
of her husband. "His soul is absorbed, quite melted in the 
great All." This she had learned from Schleiermacher. But it 
was not enough, i t  was not clear. "When I loved and knew 
God in my Ehrenfried, there were two objects of my love. 
. . . Now that he has left me alone and 'is living eternally with 
God,' are they still two lives, or only one?" 
Analogous to pantheism in religion is the absolutism of 
some idealistic metaphysicians. They question the true reality 
of any being or any activity or any value except the capital- 
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ized Absolute One. This type of philosophy has a sceptical 
tone, for it tends to relegate all the small type t~uths  and 
values familiar to our experience to the limbo of mere ap- 
pearance. 
Consider on the other hand the opposite overemphasis 
on the finite empirical character of values as manifested in 
the daily activities of individuals and social groups. This 
view espouses the principle of relativism, and in its own way 
it also has a sceptical tinge. All values are for it limited and 
transitory; in its preoccupation with the finite-empirical 
aspect of personal existence it discounts the hope of personal 
immortality. Most rigid denial characterizes materialistic 
naturalism, which sees human life with all its mental activity 
as necessarily dependent on biological processes, dependent 
all the way through, and so subject to the changes and vicis- 
situdes of the material world. Other forms of naturalism may 
not be so explicit in asserting that mind is merely an event 
in physical nature or an aptitude of the body, but they also 
emphasize the empirical and transitory character of men's 
careers. Human values, according to them, are incident to 
the conditions and reactions of men in their environment. 
They have their causes which produce, modify, and develop 
them, or which unsettle them and eventually extinguish them. 
To assert the abiding reality of persons or to hope for their 
immortality is to induIge in illusions. The persistence of 
human values is relative. The only sense in which a man 
may be said to outlive his body is in his continued social 
participation in the lives of others in their memory of him 
or in his influence on them. Men can aspire toward abiding 
worth in only one way, by identifying themselves actively 
with the larger life of civilization. But it may readily be seen 
that this sort of persistence is also relative. Civilizations and 
historical epochs are likewise transitory in the end. 
22 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
We are thus confronted with our basic alternatives. Nat- 
uralism, whether materialistic or not, suffers from the per- 
plexity of maintaining the rational validity of its principles 
while at the same time questioning the distinctive abiding 
reality of rational values. Reason cannot thus reason itself out 
of existence. Pantheism shares with other spiritual interpreta- 
tions of the world the advantage of recognizing the essential 
character of values, but in a onesided emphasis. Its merit is 
that it perceives the infinite-divine implications of values. 
Its defect is that it does not do justice to the individual and 
social expressions of rationality and values which are also 
fundamental to our understanding of them. The problem of 
personal immortality is thus a problem of achieving a reason- 
able balance, of finding a mediating course of thought that 
does not go to either extreme nor fail to keep in touch with 
both alternatives. Unless we maintain firmly the human and 
personal reality of values, we are lost eventually in universal 
abstractions. Yet personal values as we know them in the 
daily lives and careers of men involve finite and transitory 
forms of expression, both physical and mental. Apart from 
these actualities we should scarcely be able to conceive 
values. 
Is it surprising that in this predicament men's hopes have 
sought to secure from their imagination the vivid conviction 
which reason does not yield? So we have the visions of golden 
streets and pearly gates, and likewise of hell and its torments, 
and alI the rest of men's imaginings about the hereafter. 
Philosophical criticism has been needed to emancipate re- 
ligious faith from its fancies and superstitions. But the basic 
assurance of the abiding character and destiny of personality 
has not been utterly discredited, for reflection and reason 
themselves would then be discredited. On this ridge between 
opposite precarious declivities, our thought about our destiny 
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must find its way. Religious meditation has cherished and 
preserved its fundamental certainty that man's spiritual 
worth is inextinguishable. Without pride but also without 
doubt, saintly men have believed firmly and hoped confi- 
dently that the eternal values to which they have consecrated 
themselves are eternal not only in God, not only in abstract 
universality, but eternal aIso in their own unique personal 
character. This confident belief and hope has been the core 
of the idea of personal immortaIity. Pantheism has veiled 
this idea in ambiguity, but has not confuted it. 
